My research asks what normative reasons agents have, how they can come to know those reasons, and what this means for the rationality of their attitudes.

Publications

Reasons as First-Order Evidence

Erkenntnis (2026)

The reasons-as-evidence view holds that a fact is a reason for an agent to φ iff it is evidence that the agent ought to φ. Several critics argue that this view overgenerates reasons: certain background factors—facts such as that the agent can φ, or that there is no reason not to φ—would count as reasons, even though it is widely accepted that they are not. I first reconstruct this problem and explain why a prominent reply, which treats such factors as reasons in at least some cases, does not adequately address the challenge. I then propose a simple revision: reasons are first-order evidence that one ought to φ, while background factors are higher-order evidence that a certain fact is evidence that one ought to φ. I argue that this revision preserves—indeed, reinforces—the main attraction of the reasons-as-evidence view while avoiding the counterexamples.

Presented at the Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (poster, 2026) and Rationality and Normativity (2026).

Choosing, Picking, and Reason to Choose

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 28 (2025): 5–16

This paper addresses the problem of hard choices agents confront in scenarios referred to as “Hard Cases.” A key feature of Hard Cases is that an agent is presented with multiple options, each supported by reasons, but these reasons run out when considered against the reasons for other options. Another feature of Hard Cases is that it seems wrong for an agent to arbitrarily pick one option. Several views explain these features of Hard Cases, focusing primarily on the value relation between options, with discussions limited to the relata—namely, reasons for each option. However, reasons relevant to a choice encompass more than the set of reasons for individual options. After defining ‘choosing’ as distinct from ‘picking’ and introducing the notion of a ‘reason to choose,’ I argue that the reason to choose plays a role in what makes a case a Hard Case, and it is not necessarily grounded in any of the options but in the choice itself.

Dissertation

The Rationality of Regret (University of Nebraska–Lincoln, 2026). Committee: Mark van Roojen (chair), John Brunero, Aaron Bronfman, Regina Werum.

What is happening when we sincerely regret, believing that we should have acted otherwise, even if the action we believe we should have performed was not genuinely available to us? And what could make regret of this kind rational? My primary goal is to show that regret, even when based on a false belief about what one should have done, can still be rational. Each chapter of the dissertation, although it contributes to the overall argument, is intended to stand alone as a paper.

1. ‘Decisive Reason’ Implies ‘Can’

Under review. An earlier version was presented at the APA Central Division (colloquium, 2026) as “Three Arguments for the ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ Principle.”

One has a decisive reason to do something only if one can do it. This principle is widely accepted but still faces challenges. This paper provides three arguments for it: from deontic dilemmas, the transmission of reasons, and akrasia.

2. The Conditional Fallacy Problem and the Scope of ‘Can’ in Internalism about Reasons

Under review. An earlier version was presented at the APA Eastern Division (colloquium, 2026) as “Montage of the Best Internalist Formulation of Reasons.”

A plausible internalist constraint on practical reasons should abandon the counterfactual that employs an idealized agent who deliberates well. It should instead ask what deliberations are feasible for the agent, and at which point on the spectrum of her feasible deliberations she counts as deliberating well.

3. The Asymmetry of Evidence about Practical Reasons

Developed from the dissertation chapter “Reasons in Reality and Reasons in Reflection,” presented at the APA Pacific Division (symposium, 2026). An earlier version was presented at the Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (poster, 2025) as “Epistemic Bars on Beliefs About Reasons.”

There is an epistemic asymmetry between the source of a reason and the conditions and modifiers of that reason. Evidence of a reason’s source is necessary to justify the belief that the reason exists, and it is sufficient unless there is evidence that a condition fails. Evidence that its conditions or modifiers support the reason’s existence is neither necessary nor sufficient.

4. The Rationality of Regret

The belief “I should have done otherwise” and the emotion (e.g., grief) that make up regret change over time, affecting, reinforcing, and reshaping each other. The formation and change of regret and its components can be justified even when its central belief is strictly false. This paper examines the evidence for the belief and the warrant for the emotion.

5. Why Benefits Can Be the Right Kind of Reasons for Regret

Presented at Tennessee Value and Agency: Grief, Trauma, Anger, and Resilience (2026).

It is widely accepted that regret has some practical benefits, such as better future decision-making and self-identification. These benefits can be the right kind of reasons for regret; they can themselves be reasons for which we regret.

Other Papers

Moral Realism with Fundamental Moral Disagreements

Under review.

One challenge to moral realism comes from fundamental moral disagreements that persist under ideal conditions. However, moral realism remains viable even if there are such disagreements, since moral truths are such that the total evidence available to us for them essentially overlaps with the evidence for a range of reasonable views, so it is impossible to single out the moral truths from among those views.

The Way Reasons Transmit to Necessary and Non-necessary Means

Presented at the APA Central Division (colloquium, 2025).

Many philosophers accept that if an agent has a reason to pursue an end, then she has a reason to take the necessary means to that end. This paper explores whether and how such reason transmission extends to non-necessary means. I argue that the principles proposed by Kiesewetter and Gertken (2021) face two major problems, and I develop two new principles: one explains how reasons for ends transmit to reasons for means in both necessary and non-necessary means cases; the other explains how negative normative factors transmit from means back to ends.